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INFLATION AND REPUTATION: COMMENT
Aart de Zeeuw
Tilburg University, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
In a recent article in this Review (June 1985) David Backus and John
Driffill develop a model which can explain when and why governments in-
flate in a rational expectations environment. In this introduction the
history of the problem will be sketched with game theory terminology and
the approach chosen by Backus and Driffill will be summarized. The fol-
lowing sections will attend to necessary corrections and the consequences
of these corrections.
The problem goes back to an example in a paper by Finn Kydland and Edward
Prescott (197~, p. 4~~). They compare what they call the consistent equi-
librium with some inflation to the optimal equilibrium with no inflation.
The optimal equilibrium is better than the consistent equilibrium because
in both cases unemployment ends up at its natural rate. In game theory
terms they compare the Nash outcome to the Stackelberg outcome where the
Stackelberg outcome is Pareto superior. In this game the government
chooses actual inflation and the private sector chooses expected infla-
tion. Although it is assumed that government and private sector make their
~`) I am indebted to Jan Potters for expressing his unease with the arti-
cle commented upon which eventually led to this comment and to Thijs
ten Raa for helpful suggestions regarding the text.
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choices simultaneously, the government might acquire leadership by announ-
cing the choice beforehand. If the private sector believes the announce-
ment, the Stackelberg ( optimal) outcome with no inflation results. How-
ever, a problem of credibility arises. The point is that the government
can consider to announce zero inflation and to inflate nevertheless in
order to create surprise inflation which raises output and lowers unem-
ployment. Therefore it is said that the announcement of zero inflation is
not credible. In fact the only credible ennouncement in this respect is
the Nash announcement. However, low inflation can become credible when
time and future are introduced or, to put it differently, when the game is
repeated. The idea is that the government w311 not cheat on announced
inflation when it will be punished with high inflation and unemployment in
the future. Robert Barro and David Gordon (1983) find what they call the
best enforceable rule in a repeated game with infinite horizon and a
punishment interval of one period. This credible rule lies somewhere inbe-
tween the Nash and Stackelberg announcements and can be characterized as
low but nonzero inflation.
The problem with a finite horizon suffers from the "chain-store paradox"
introduced by Reinhard Selten (19~8). In the final period the rational
government will always inflate: there is no demonstration effect of not
cheating, because there is no future to gain from this effect. A backward
recursive argument leads to inflation in all periods. David Kreps and
Robert Wilson (1982) develop a concept of reputation in this type of mo-
dels by introducing imperfect information. Backus and Driffill apply this
idea to the problem at stake. The private sector is not sure that it ís
dealing with a"wet" government which is struggling with the trade off
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between inflation and unemployment. The government might be of the "hard-
nosed" type that fights inflation at all costs. In turn the "wet" govern-
ment can use this uncertainty on the side of the private sector to build
up a reputation of being "hard-nosed" in order to have the private sector
believing announcements of zero inflation. The equilibrium concept that is
used is called sequential equilibrium. The game is solved in a dynamic
programming framework which yields subgame perfectness and thus time con-
sistency. At every stage a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is calculated
given the probability attached by the private sector to the government
being "hard-nosed" (the reputation). The series of these probabilities
satisfies Bayes' rule.
The purpose of this comment is to show that the reputational equilibrium
derived by Backus and Driffill is not a sequential equilibrium (the same
applies to the result of Kreps and Wilson). A small adjustment leads to a
sequential equilibrium, but this reputational equilibrium does not yield
one of the main conclusions of the Backus and Driffill analysis. Their
conclusion that if the initial reputation is bad the model generates re-
cessions with a positive probability does not hold. Section I corrects
Sections II and III from the article by Backus and Driffill. Section II is
a conclusion.
I. Reputational Equilibrium
On page 534 Backus and Driffill write "The government now chooses yT-1 to
maximize (5) subject to (3)". In (5) the value vg(T,pT) of the game for
the government at the final period occurs. The expression for vg(T,pT) can
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be found on page 533. Because at this point for pT -} the public ia in-
different about ita action zT, the precise expression for v(T,pT) isg
vg(T,P.L) -
1 , pT ~ },
2zT - 1. PT - }.
-1 . P.r ( ~ .
The crucial point is that, in contrast with what Backus and Driffill
claim, for all pT-1 (} and 0( zT ~ 1 there is no optimal action yT-1 for
the government. For pT-1 (} the payoff to the government
J (T-l,p ) -2z -2ty v (Tp )g T-1 T-1 T-1 g' T
with
pT - pT-1,~pT-1 } (1 - pT-1)yT-1]
has a supremum
sup J(T-1,P )- 2z - 2 4 P ~~1 - P-]. P ~}.g T-1 T-1 T-1 T 1 T-1 -
but this supremum can only be reached for zT - 1. For zT ~ 1 ar~y action
yT-1 considered can be improved by an action yT-1 which gives a larger
payoff. Figure 1 shows the controllable part yT-ivg(T,pT) of the payoff as
a function of the action YT-1' For yT-1 - pT-1,~1 - pT-1] the function







~ pT-1,~1 - pT-1~
Figure 1
1 yT-1
If pT-1 -~ then PT-1~~1 - pT-1~ - 1 and the negative part of the figure
ndisappears. Table 1 shows which actions yT-1 glve a larger payoff consi-
dering all possible actions YT-1'
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Table 1
yT-1 ~ PT-1,~1 - PT-1~ YT-1 ~ yT-1 ~ pT-1,~1 - pT-1~
yT-1 - pT-1,~1 - pT-1~ ~2z,I, - 1)Y.I.-1 ~ YT-1 ~ PT-1,~1 - pT-1~
yT-1 ~ pT-1,~1 - pT-1~ yT-1 ~ YT-1
For zT - 1, however, the optimal action is
yT-1 - PT-1,~1 - PT-1~. PT-1 ~~. zT - 1.
This implies that, in contrast with what Backus and Driffill claim on
pages 533 and 534, the only equilibrium action of the public at period T
for pT -} is zT - 1. The same applies for all the other periods which
yields the equilibrium strategy for the public
1. P ~ ~~i)T-ttl~t -
zt
0~ Pt ~ ~~)T-ttl.
The equilibrium strategy for the "wet" government remains the same as in
Backus and Driffill. The expression for the value function on page 535.
however, should be corrected and not only due to the chsnges in the pu-
blics strategy. The correct expression is
n
~
(2T-ttl - (T-tt2))Pt~L1-pt] - (T-t.l). 0 ~ pt C (~)T-ttl~
~g(t~pt) - (21}1 - (if2))Pt~Ll-pt] - (i-1) . (~)i;l ~ Pt ~ (~)i.
i - 1,2,...,T-t,
t - 1,2,...,T-1.
The consequences of these changes for the example in Section III of Backus
and Driffill are that if the government dces not inflate the public always
expects zero inflation. The reputation of the government in the periods
after period one grows just enough to induce the public to choose zero
expected inflation with probability 1. This means that, in contrast with
what Backus and Driffill claim on page 535. the probability of getting a
recession (xe - 1, x- 0) is zero. The expected payoff to the government
vg(l,pl) is equal to (26p1~[1-pl] - 3) which is still better than the
payoff -4 resulting from not playing the reputational strategy. If the
government, however, choosea zero inflation with probability 1 and if the
initial reputation i s bad (pl C 1~32 in the example), the reputation re-
mains bad according to Bayes' rule and the public expects inflation with
probability 1 which leads to a heavy recession.
II. Conclusion
Backus and Driffill use the sequential equilibrium concept to solve the
macroeconomic policy game of inflation and expected inflation formulated
by Barro and Gordon. If there is a possibility that the private sector
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believes that the government is "hard-nosed", a"wet" government can build
up a reputation of being "hard-nosed" in order to create some surprise
inflation with a raise in output. Backus and Driffill slso conclude in
their article that the sequential equilibrium induces a positive probabi-
lity of recessions. This comment shows, however, that due to a technical
error in the derivation of their sequential equilibrium this conclusion
does not hold. The only sequential equilibrium for this macroeconomic
policy game attaches zero probability to the case of recessions. Reces-
sions only occur if the government is "hard-nosed" but has a very bad
reputation of being so.
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